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Case No. 20131175-CA 
INTHE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
BRYCE BELL, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for two counts of aggravated 
robbery, first degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2) G) (West Supp. 2014). 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant-armed with a knife-threatened the victim and her 
friend, then tried to steal her car. When Defendant realized that his plan 
would not work, he changed it and stole the victim's purse instead. 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, one 
for attempting to steal the car and one for stealing the purse. Defendant 
1 Defendant is not appealing either his threatening the use of a 
dangerous weapon in a fight or his interference with an officer convictions. 
He appeals only his aggravated robbery convictions. 
does not deny that he committed aggravated robbery, but argues that the 
evidence supported only one conviction not two. Because his claims are 
unpreserved, Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred for not sua 
sponte finding that his counsel was ineffective for not asserting that under 
the single larceny doctrine he committed only one aggravated robbery. 
Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for: (1) not asserting a 
factual impossibility defense to the aggravated robbery charge related to his 
attempt to steal the car; and (2) not moving for a directed verdict on the 
ground that the State's evidence did not negate his voluntary intoxication 
defense. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Has Defendant proven that the trial court plainly erred by sending 
both aggravated robbery charges to the jury or that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to the presentation of both charges? 
Standard of Review. Plain error requires a showing of obvious, 
prejudicial error. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, if13, 10 P.3d 346. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal are 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,r11, 328 P.3d 841. 
2. Has Defendant proven that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
arguing factual impossibility or moving for a directed verdict? 
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Standard of Review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for 
the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 
15, if 11, 328 P.3d 841. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
• Utah Code Ann.§ 76-4-101(1) (West 2014) (attempt) 
• Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2014) (robbery) 
• Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2014) (aggravated robbery) 
• Utah Code Ann.§ 76-4-101(3)(b)(West 2014) (factual impossibility) 
• Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-306 (West 2014) (voluntary intoxication) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 
A. Summary of facts. 
Defendant threatened Brenda and her friend with a knife and tried to 
steal Brenda's car. When he could not, he changed his plan and stole her 
purse instead. 
Morah, Brenda, and Kendra were ujust having a girl's day out" when 
they stopped at a cell phone store. R124:82-83, 104-105. Morah parked 
Brenda's brand-new car, leaving it unlocked with the keys to a different 
rental car in the cup holder. R124:84. 
2 Unless otherwise stated, the facts are recited in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ,r 2, 6 P.3d 1116. 
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Defendant was inside the store trying to buy a new phone for his 
sister. R124:107, 143; R125:50. Defendant talked to the manager, but became 
"impatient." R124:107,143-144. He became ''kind of loud," went through the 
merchandise racks, "lift[ed] up his shirt," and used too much hand 
sanitizer. R124:87-88, 107. Defendant then argued with the manager and 
eventually left the store "pretty angry," "yelling and shouting." R124:107-
108, 155. 
In the parking lot, Defendant "started checking" car door handles. 
R124:155. Defendant tried the door handles of "five or six" cars. R124:178. 
Defendant "looked in" each car and "then tried to pull the handle." 
R124:178. He "checked a pickup truck first," "looked in it" and "lifted [the 
door] handle." R124:155. Defendant then "peered in the windows" of a 
small sedan and "tried to open the door." R124:177. He "walked over to the 
car" "next to it" and" did the same thing to that one." R124:177. Eventually, 
Defendant opened the door to Brenda's car and climbed into the driver's 
seat. R124:110. 
When Morah, Brenda, and Kendra saw Defendant sitting in Brenda's 
car, all three ran out of the store and confronted him. R124:109-100. Morah 
ran to the driver's side, Brenda to the passenger side, and Kendra stood in 
front of the car. R124:89-90, 110. Morah reached the car first, opened the 
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door, and stood on the inside of the driver's door, between the door and 
Defendant. R124:89-90. Morah "repeatedly" told Defendant "to get out of 
my car." R124:89. 
Ignoring Morah, Defendant repeatedly asked where the ignition was 
while holding the rental car keys. R124:90,125. Morah responded each time, 
"Get out of the car." R124:90. Defendant tried to close the car door on 
Morah, but she "ripped" the door back open and again told Defendant, 
"You need to get out of the car." R124:91. 
Defendant responded by pulling a knife from underneath his shirt 
and pointing it at Morah. R124:91, State's Exhibit 3. Morah jumped back and 
yelled to Brenda, "He has a knife. You need to get back." R124:93. 
Defendant turned the knife on Brenda, who was standing on the passenger-
side, but Brenda was in shock and unable to move. R124:94-95, 111-113. 
Defendant then saw Brenda's purse sitting on the passenger side 
floor. R124:112. Continuing to threaten Brenda with the knife, Defendant 
picked up the purse, "got out of the car and started running with it." 
R124:112. 
Brenda, Kendra, and Morah ran after Defendant. They chased him 
through the shopping center, with Morah yelling to bystanders, "He has a 
knife." R124:113, 127. The cell phone store manager joined the chase, yelling 
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"That purse is stolen." R124:127, 145. As Defendant ran through the 
shopping center, "someone pushed him, but he kept [his] balance and kept 
running with the purse in his hand.'' R124:147. Defendant fell down twice 
because "his shoe kept falling off," but he still kept running. R124:180. A car 
then "cut him off" and a woman leapt out, ripping "the purse from 
[Defendant's] hands." R124:127,156,173. Brenda's "stuff went flying 
everywhere," but Defendant "picked up a pair of keys that dropped out" 
and "kept on running." R124:127, 157, 183. Brenda, Kendra, and Morah 
followed. R124:127-128. 
In an effort to stop Defendant, a driver "bumped" him with his car, 
and told Defendant to "drop the stuff." R124:157-157, 173-174. But 
Defendant tried to negotiate with the driver, asking whether the driver 
would "get [him] out of here." R124:158. The driver finally cornered 
Defendant with his car. Defendant rolled on the hood, but continued to try 
to run. Defendant finally threw the keys "in the bushes." R124:127-8, 158-
159. 
Officer Justin Ellis arrived and arrested Defendant. R124:159; R125:8-
9. Officer Ellis found two knives and one knife sheath in Defendant's 
pockets. R125:14. He also found a set of car keys and "a couple of IDs" in 
the bushes where Defendant was cornered. R124:159, R125:18-19. 
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At the police station, Defendant admitted that he had "tried to take 
some lady's car." R125:32. Defendant told officers that he "was on 
methamphetamine," and that he had not slept or eaten in three days. 
R125:23. During questioning, Defendant responded appropriately and 
coherently, communicated clearly with officers, did not slur his words, and 
was "very communicative." Rl25:24-25. 
When Defendant later vomited at the jail, paramedics evaluated him, 
but did not transport him to the hospital. R125:23-24. But because 
Defendant had been ill, Detective Ben Pender was concerned that the jail 
would not take Defendant. R125:33-34. Defendant was thereafter taken to 
the hospital for an evaluation. R125:33. 
The trial 
Trial counsel presented a voluntary intoxication defense, arguing that 
Defendant "was too high to form the requisite knowing and intentional 
intent to have committed" the crimes. R125:78. Trial counsel based her 
defense on Defendant's testilnony and witness testimony that Defendant 
acted oddly and erratically, was not 11 himself that day," "looked like a 
junkie," was ill at the jail, and had admitted to officers that he had used 
1nethamphetamine that day. R124:160,187-89, 190; R125:23. 
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But Defendant testified that he did not admit to using 
methamphetamine that day. R125:47. Defendant testified only that he 
"honestly" did not "remember most" of what happened. R125:46. 
Defendant testified that he did not remember "being in the store at all" or 
even telling officers that he had used drugs that day. R124:47. 
Yet Defendant could recall the more mundane details of that day. He 
remembered that his friend had brought chairs to his sister's house for his 
niece, that they returned the chairs at the store together, and that he later 
bought five 32-ounce beers. R125:46, 50. Defendant remembered that he 
went home, 11 drank one" of the beers, and agreed to help his sister get a cell 
phone. R125:46. Defendant testified that he then remembered running, 
being told II the cops are coming to get you," and that he dropped some 
keys. R125:46, 50-51. Defendant said that he also remembered being "in the 
hospital" and that one of the hospital staff members was Polynesian. 
R125:46-47, 50-51. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Defendant with two counts of aggravated 
robbery- one for the purse and one for the car; one count of aggravated 
assault; and one count of interference with an arresting officer. R33-34. The 
jury convicted Defendant of both counts of aggravated robbery and 
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interference with an arresting officer. R85. The jury acquitted him of 
aggravated assault and instead convicted him of the lesser included offense 
of brandishing a dangerous weapon in a fight. R85. The trial court 
sentenced Defendant to two indeterminate terms of five years to life in 
prison and to one indeterminate term not to exceed one year in prison. 
R126, Rl0S-106. The court declined to impose a sentence for Defendant's 
conviction for interference with an arresting officer. R126:15. 
Defendant timely appeals. R107. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point 1: For the first time on appeal, Defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated robbery conviction 
for attempting to steal the car. Defendant argues that the trial court plainly 
erred by sending the charge to the jury because the evidence did not show 
that he committed two separate aggravated robberies. He also argues that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the charge on 
this ground. 
Defendant has not carried his heavy burden to show either plain error 
or ineffective assistance of counsel. A person commits aggravated robbery 
when he either: uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon during a 
robbery or attempts to steal an operable motor vehicle. The single larceny 
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doctrine applies only if that person commits multiple offenses that share a 
common intent. But the single larceny doctrine does not apply when a 
separate and distinct intent exists for each crime. Here, Defendant had two 
objectives: (1) to steal Brenda's car; and (2) to steal her purse. He also had 
two criminal acts: (1) he tried to steal Brenda's car; and (2) he stole her 
purse. Thus, he committed two separate robberies. The jury heard 
testimony that Defendant intended to steal the victim's car, but when he 
realized that he could not, he changed his plan and stole her purse instead. 
The evidence thus established that Defendant committed two crimes, not 
one. Defendant has not proved either plain error or ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Point 2: Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective: 
(1) for not presenting a factual impossibility defense and (2) for not moving 
the court for a directed verdict on the ground that the State had not 
presented sufficient evidence to negate his voluntary intoxication defense. 
Both claims fail. 
A factual impossibility defense cannot apply to an attempt crime. For 
Defendant to be guilty of aggravated robbery, the State had to prove only 
that he attempted to take the victim's car. Thus, the fact that it would have 
been impossible for him to do so would not have provided a defense. 
-10-
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Defendant, therefore, has not shown that his counsel was ineffective for 
asserting this inapplicable defense. 
Nor was Defendant's counsel required to move for a directed verdict 
where the State presented sufficient evidence to support an inference that 
Defendant had the ability to act with the requisite mental state. While trial 
counsel presented a voluntary intoxication defense, the State's evidence 
negated it. Thus, any motion for a directed verdict would have been futile. 
For these reasons, Defendant cannot show that his trial counsel's 
performance fell outside of the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance. Nor can he show that he suffered any prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVEN PLAIN ERROR OR INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY 
CONVICTED OF Two DISTINCT AND SEPARATE AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY CRIMES 
For the first time on appeal, Defendant argues that his trial counsel 
was ineffective and the trial court plainly erred for "allow[ing] two counts 
of aggravated robbery to go the jury." Br. Aplt. 18. Defendant argues that 
under the single larceny doctrine "only one aggravated robbery count was 
allowed" because "there was one criminal episode and one victim." Br. 
-11-
Aplt. 11. Defendant argues that the second aggravated robbery count "must 
be vacated." Br. Aplt. 11 
At bottom, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for 
his aggravated robbery conviction for attempting to steal the car. 
Defendant's challenge fails because the single larceny doctrine is 
inapplicable. Under the single larceny doctrine, the key is Defendant's 
intent. The evidence here established that Defendant formed two distinct 
intents. Defendant first attempted to steal the car. But when that plan 
proved too difficult, he decided to steal the purse instead. That the crimes 
occurred close in time and that the Defendant victimized the same victim 
twice is immaterial. By forming separate and distinct intents, Defendant 
committed two crimes, not one. Because the single larceny doctrine is 
inapplicable, Defendant cannot show that the trial court plainly erred by not 
sua sponte applying it or that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
asserting it. 
A. The evidence established that Defendant committed two 
distinct and separate crimes. 
As stated, Defendant does not dispute that he committed aggravated 
robbery. Rather, he argues that under the single larceny doctrine the 
evidence established only that he committed one aggravated robbery, not 
two. 
-12-
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When reviewing a preserved challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, this Court "sustain[ s] the trial court's judgment unless it is against 
the clear weight of the evidence or if [it] otherwise reach[es] a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Titus, 2012 UT App 
231, ,r2, 286 P.3d 941 ( citation and quotations omitted). But when a 
sufficiency challenge is unpreserved, as Defendant acknowledges is the case 
here, an appellant must demonstrate both that "the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime," and that the "insufficiency 
was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred" by not catching 
it on its own. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,Il7, 10 P.3d 346. 
A person commits aggravated robbery "if in the course of committing 
robbery," he either: (1) "uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon"; or 
(2) "takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302(1)(a) & (c) (West 2014). A person commits robbery when he 
"unlawfully and intentionally" "takes or attempts to take personal property 
in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence," 
"against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to 
deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal property." 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-301(1)(a)(West 2014). 
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_ The single larceny doctrine determines what constitutes a single 
offense of theft. See State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980). In Kimbel, 
620 P.2d at 518, the Utah Supreme Court held that whether multiple takings 
constitute a single offense or multiple offenses rests solely on the 
defendant's intent: "The general test as to whether there are separate 
offenses or one offense is whether the evidence discloses one general intent 
or discloses separate and distinct intents." Thus, whether the victim is the 
same or a new victim is immaterial. State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 
1981); see State v. Mickel, 65 P.484, 485 (Utah 1901) ("where many articles are 
stolen at one time, there is only one theft, whether the ownership is one or 
many"). 
The single larceny doctrine limits "charging discretion in the context 
of aggregating or separating theft counts based on their dollar value for the 
purpose of maximizing criminal liability." State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 
71, ,I15, 299 P.3d 625. Essentially, the single larceny doctrine prevents a 
defendant who steals one hundred dollars from being charged one hundred 
times- one charge for each dollar stolen. See Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 518 (Kimbel 
stole multiple thread protectors over time, constituting one continuous plan 
with one intent equating to a single offense); see also State v. McCarthy, 483 
P.2d 890 (Utah 1971) (McCarthy was charged once for stealing 19 hams 
-14-
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because the thefts were part of one continuous episode committed with the 
same intent). 
But, the single larceny doctrine does not apply if multiple crimes are 
committed, each with a different intent. Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 518. Rather, the 
doctrine requires that the crimes have the same objective. See Barker, 624 
P.2d at 696; Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, ,112. Thus, the single larceny 
doctrine is not satisfied merely because the crimes occurred close in time 
and have the same victim. See Barker, 624 P.2d at 696; Rasabout, 2013 UT App 
71, ,112. 
In Barker, Barker smashed the windshields of multiple cars "at the 
same place and in rapid succession." 624 P.2d at 695-96. The Utah Supreme 
Court held that the single larceny doctrine was inapplicable because each 
car had a separate owner whose windshield was destroyed by "separate 
acts of the defendant." Id at 696. While the Court considered that the each 
car had a different owner, ownership was not the determining factor. Id. at 
695 (when the taking is a single act, there is one offense; "multiple 
ownership" is immaterial). The bottom line was Barker's intent. Because 
Barker had a separate intent for each windshield that he damaged, "each 
separate act of destruction constitutes" a separate crime. Id. 
-15-
So too here. Defendant's aggravated robberies, while part of the same 
criminal episode, were separate and distinct crimes. Defendant had a 
separate intent for attempting to steal the car and stealing the purse. See 
Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 518. As Defendant admitted that his initial plan was to 
steal a car: "I tried to steal some lady's car." R125:32. But when Defendant 
realized he could not accomplish that goal, he changed his plan. In that 
instant, Defendant's intent was to steal the purse. See State v. Rudolph, 970 
P.2d 1221, 1228 (Utah 1998)(guilty of aggravated burglary despite forming 
intent to sexually assault victim after breaking into victim's house); State v. 
Garcia, 2010 UT App 196, ,I13, 236 P.3d 853 (defendant formed intent to 
assault victim after he broke into her home). As in Barker, Defendant 
committed two separate crimes, each with distinguishable intents. The 
single larceny doctrine therefore does not apply. 
And because Defendant committed two separate and distinct acts 
with separate and distinct intents, his case is distinguishable both from State 
v. Irvin, 2007 UT App 319, 169 P.3d 798 and State v. Fischer, 1368 N.E.2d 332 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1977). Irvin held up a convenience store clerk and, in one fell 
swoop, stole the cash from the register and the clerk's car key, and then 
used the clerk's car to make his getaway. 2007 UT App 319, ,r,r2, 19. This 
Court held that only one act of aggravated robbery occurred because taking 
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the keys was part of "one intention, one general impulse, and one plan," 
likely to facilitate Irvin's escape with the stolen money. Id. at ,I19 (citation 
omitted). Unlike Irvin, however, Defendant here formed two separate plans: 
first to steal the car and, second, to steal the purse. Moreover, unlike in Irvin, 
the jury was properly instructed on the aggravated operable motor vehicle 
factor. R207, 2083; Irvin, 2007 UT App 319, ,I,I19-20, ,I20 n. 4. And, here, 
Defendant attempted to steal the car in the presence of the victim, unlike 
Irvin where the car was not taken from the victim's presence. R124:90-91, 
110; Irvin, 2007 UT App 319, ,I19. 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Fischer is also unpersuasive. Fischer 
stole a h·uck containing automotive tools and was charged with two thefts -
one for the truck and one for the tools. 368 N.E. 2d at 333. The Ohio Court 
of Appeals held that Fischer committed one act by stealing the truck, and 
therefore could be charged with only one crime. Id. at 334. Like Irvin, 
Fischer had "one intention, one general impulse, and one plan," to steal the 
3 The record was supplemented to include the jury instructions. R135, 
197-230. The jury instructions were transcribed from the trial audio 
recording. R154; see R144. The supplemental index lists R53-76 as the jury 
instructions, but those documents are Defendant's proposed instructions 
and not the insh·uctions read to the jury. This brief, therefore, cites to the 
transcript of the jury instructions. 
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truck, but never had a separate plan to steal the tools. Irvin, 2007 UT App 
319, ,I19; Fischer, 368 N.E. 2d at 333. 
Thus, Fischer is likewise inapposite here because, as explained, 
Defendant had separate intentions and plans. Admittedly, if Defendant had 
actually stolen the car with the purse in it, he could be charged only with 
one crime, because in that case he would have only possessed one intent-
to steal the car. In that scenario, stealing the purse would be incidental. But 
Defendant had two separate intents-first, to steal the car, and, when that 
wouldn't work, to steal the purse. Stealing the purse was not incidental, it 
was a separate and distinct act motivated by a separate and newly formed 
plan. 
In sum, the evidence demonstrates that Defendant committed two 
separate and distinct crimes because he had two separate and distinct 
intents. 
B. Defendant cannot show either deficient per£ ormance or 
plain error because his counsel had a conceivable reasonable 
strategy for not objecting. 
Defendant has not shown- and cannot show - either ineffective 
assistance of counsel or plain error. To prove ineffective assistance, 
Defendant must prove deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To prove plain error, Defendant must 
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show obvious, prejudicial error. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I13. As explained 
below, ineffective assistance and plain error share a common prejudice 
standard: that absent counsel's or the trial court's alleged error there is a 
reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. If 
Defendant fails to meet '' any one of these requirements," neither ineffective 
assistance nor "plain error is ... established." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1209 (Utah 1993); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,522 (Utah 1994). 
1. Defendant has not proved deficient performance. 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
incorporating the single larceny doctrine as part of his trial strategy and 
thus allowing both aggravated robbery charges to be sent to the jury. Br. 
Aplt. 21. But Defendant has not met his heavy burden of proof. 
As explained, the single larceny doctrine was inapplicable. 
Defendant's trial counsel had no duty to invoke a trial strategy that did not 
apply, and thus would have been futile to assert. See State v. Chacon, 962 
P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) ("Neither speculative claims nor counsel's failure to 
make futile objections establishes ineffective assistance of counsel."); see also 
State v. Feather/wt, 2011 UT App 154, ,I36, 257 P.3d 445 (holding that because 
sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict, trial counsel's failure to 
make "such a futile motion cannot establish ineffective assistance of 
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counsel"). Defendant therefore has not shown that his counsel was 
ineffective. See Feather/wt, 2011 UT App 154, if 36. 
Defendant argues that trial counsel did not use the single larceny 
doctrine because she did not "understand[] the law." Br. Aplt. 20-21; see 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ~11, 12 P.3d 92 (a defendant bears the burden 
of ensuring the record is adequate). On the contrary, and as demonstrated 
above, trial counsel's decision not to assert the single larceny doctrine 
showed that counsel correctly understood that the doctrine was 
inapplicable. Indeed, trial counsel's duty was to invoke strategies grounded 
in the application of the correct law. She did that here by choosing not to 
assert an inapplicable theory and by instead focusing on Defendant's 
claimed inability to form the requisite intent. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-689. 
Trial counsel cross-exa1nined each witness on Defendant's behavior, setting 
up an involuntary intoxication defense and Defendant's testimony that he 
did not remember the crime at all. R124:99, 118, 130, 137, 152, 159, 174, 180, 
184; 125:22, 34, 45-48. Thus, Defendant cannot prove his trial counsel's 
per£ ormance was not "within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
-20-
2. Defendant has not proved obvious error. 
For essentially the same reasons, Defendant cannot prove that the 
trial court obviously erred in not sua sponte dismissing the aggravated 
robbery charge for attempting to steal the car. Defendant has not proven 
that the evidence supporting his aggravated robbery conviction for the car 
was II inherently improbable" or II sufficiently inconclusive." State v. Mead, 
2001 UT 58, if 65, 27 P.3d 1115 (citations and quotations omitted). As 
explained, the evidence demonstrated that Defendant committed two 
separate and distinct crimes. Defendant therefore cannot show that any 
alleged "evidentiary insufficiency is so obvious and fundamental" that the 
trial court should have sua sponte intervened. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, if17. 
C. Defendant has not proved prejudice. 
As stated, ineffective assistance and plain error share a common 
standard: "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-9; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Defendant "bears the burden of establishing prejudice as a demonstrable 
reality," and "the likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just 
conceivable." State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, if 30, 302 P.3d 844 
(quotations and citations omitted); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 792 
(2011). 
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To prove prejudice here, Defendant must show that if he had 
objected- or the trial court intervened- the trial court would have 
dismissed one of the aggravated robbery counts. See McNeil, 2013 UT App 
134, if 30. He cannot do so because, as explained, the single larceny doctrine 
was inapplicable. Asserting that doctrine therefore would not have led to 
the dismissal of one of the aggravated robbery charges. 
In sum, Defendant has shown neither plain error nor ineffective 
assistance. 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT ARGUING FACTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY OR 
FOR NOT MOVING FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT4 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
in two additional ways. First, he argues that it was factually impossible to 
steal the car because he had the wrong car keys. He, thus, reasons that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting a factual impossibility 
defense. Br. Aplt. 23. Second, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for not moving for a directed verdict on the ground that the State did not 
present sufficient evidence to negate his voluntary intoxication defense. Br. 
Aplt. 28. Defendant has not proved either claim. 
4 This point responds to Appellant's Points II and III. See Br. Aplt. 23-
37. 
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As stated, to prove that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must 
prove both that his counsel's performance was deficient and that, "but for" 
her deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. 689-690, 694. 
To prove deficient performance, a defendant must overcome the 
strong presumption that counsel's performance "fell 'within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance"' and that the challenged action is 
"considered sound trial strategy." State v. Tennyson, 850 P. 2d 461,465 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 
15, if 43, 328 P.3d 841 (trial counsel given "wide latitude in making tactical 
decisions"); see State v. Walker, 2010 UT App 157, ,r 14,235 P.3d 766 (whether 
to call expert witness is matter of trial strategy not questioned unless there 
is no reasonable basis for it). A court "must judge the reasonableness of 
counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of 
the time of counsel's conduct," not in hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
Judicial scrutiny of an attorney's performance "must be highly deferential" 
because it is "too easy for a court, examining counsel's [performance] after it 
has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of 
counsel was umeasonable." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,I89, 150 P.3d 480 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). A defendant is entitled to relief only if 
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he "persuade[s] the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for 
counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,16, 89 P.3d 162 (citation and 
quotation omitted) (emphasis omitted); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
To prove prejudice, as stated, Defendant must establish that there is a 
reasonable probability that "but for" counsel's unprofessional errors, "the 
result" "would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also 
Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50; McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ,130. Again, Defendant 
"bears the burden of establishing prejudice as a demonstrable reality." 
McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ,130 (citation and quotation omitted). To carry 
that burden, Defendant must show that that "the likelihood of a different 
result" is "substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 792. 
A. Defendant has not shown that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not presenting a factual impossibility defense. 
Defendant argues that because he had the wrong car keys, it was 
factually impossible for him to steal the car. Br. Aplt. 24. On this basis, 
Defendant argues his counsel was ineffective for not arguing factual 
impossibility or "object[ing] to the second aggravated robbery count." Br. 
Aplt. 26-28. Defendant cannot show that his counsel was ineffective because 
a factual impossibility defense was inapplicable where the State had to 
show only that Defendant attempted to steal the victim's car. 
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As explained, a person commits aggravated robbery if, during a 
robbery, he "takes or attempts to take an operable vehicle." Utah Code Ann.§ 
76-6-302(1)(c)(emphasis added). Thus, the State had to show only that 
Defendant attempted to steal the victim's car, not that he actually stole it or 
could have succeeded in stealing it. 
The statute provides that when the State has to prove only an 
attempt, an impossibility defense does not apply: "A defense to the offense 
of attempt does not arise": (b)"due to factual or legal impossibility." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3)(b)(West 2014). Defendant argues that this statute 
cannot apply because he was not charged with an attempt crime. Br. Aplt. 
24. True, the State did not charge Defendant with attempted aggravated 
robbery. Bµt that is because, as explained, aggravated robbery includes 
either a completed or an attempted robbery of an operable motor vehicle. 
Utah Code.§ 76-6-302(1)(c). 
The evidence showed here that Defendant attempted to steal the 
victim's car. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1)(a)(attempt requires substantial 
step and intent to commit the crime). Defendant took a substantial step 
towards stealing the car when he got in the driver's seat, grabbed keys that 
he apparently believed belonged to the car, and searched for the ignition. 
All these actions were indicative of Defendant's intent to steal the car. In 
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fact, Defendant admitted to police that he attempted to steal the victim's car. 
R125:32. 
Because the aggravated robbery was complete when Defendant 
attempted to steal the victim's car from her immediate presence by force or 
fear, any effort by counsel to raise an impossibility defense would have 
been futile. As explained, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make a 
futile objection. Chacon, 962 P.2d at 51 ("Neither speculative claims nor 
counsel's failure to make futile objections establishes ineffective assistance 
of counsel."); Feather hat, 2011 UT App 154, 136 (trial counsel's failure to 
make "such a futile motion cannot establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel"). Thus, Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective 
for not asserting the impossibility defense. 
B. Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective for 
not moving for a directed verdict on the ground that the 
State's evidence did not overcome his voluntary intoxication 
defense because ample evidence supported a finding that 
Defendant acted with the requisite mental state. 
Finally, Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not 
moving for a directed verdict because the "State did not put on sufficient 
evidence to overcome" his voluntary intoxication defense. Br. Aplt. 28. But 
because sufficient evidence supported the inference that Defendant could 
form the requisite mental state, Defendant has not shown that no reasonable 
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trial attorney would have forgone an objection. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,r6. Nor 
can Defendant show that had his counsel objected, the outcome would have 
been different. 
A person is entitled to a voluntary intoxication defense only if it 
"negates the existence of" a knowing or intentional mental state "which is 
an element of the offense." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-306 (West 2014). As with 
any affirmative defense, the defendant has the initial burden to adduce 
evidence providing a reasonable basis for the defense, after which the State 
must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sellers, 2011 UT App 
38, if 15, 248 P.3d 70. "Unless defense counsel could make" the "precise 
showing" that "the alcohol deprived [him] of the capacity to form the 
mental state necessary" for the offense, "evidence of defendant's excessive 
intoxication would be wholly counterproductive." State v. Cummins, 839 
P.2d 848,857 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. Gunn, 132 P.2d 109, 111 (Utah 
1942) (holding evidence of intoxication insufficient for reasonable person to 
conclude that it negated mental state for burglary and affirming trial court's 
refusal to instruct jury on voluntary intoxication). 
The requisite mental state for aggravated robbery, as relevant here, is 
that a defendant: (1) "intentionally" takes or attempts to take another's 
property; (2) "with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently 
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or temporarily of the personal property"; (3) while using or threatening to 
use a dangerous weapon; or that a Defendant takes or attempts to take an 
operable motor vehicle. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301(1)(a),§76-6-
302(1)(a)&(c). Thus, to assert a voluntary intoxication defense, Defendant 
had to prove that his intoxication prevented him from either: (1) 
intentionally taking or attempting to take the victim's car or purse; (2) 
intending to deprive her of her car or purse; (3) or understanding that he 
was using a dangerous weapon or attempting to take an operable motor 
vehicle. 
Defendant did not adduce sufficient evidence to be entitled to the 
defense, but regardless, the State's evidence negated it. Trial counsel elicited 
testimony that Defendant behaved oddly, was not "acting [like] himself," 
and was ill at the jail. R124:187-88, 189; R125:23. And the officer testified that 
Defendant admitted to drug use. R125:23. But Defendant testified only that 
he suffered from amnesia, although he could remember that he drank one 
32-ounce beer before the robberies. R125:46,50. He never admitted to drug 
use. See R125:46-51. This evidence was not enough to prove intoxication, let 
alone intoxication sufficient to negate Defendant's mental state. 
Mere "proof of drinking or being drunk" does not support the 
defense. Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ,r22, 123 P.3d 400 ("proof of drinking or 
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being drunk" provides no reasonable basis for the defense); Honie v. State, 
2014 UT 19, if55, 342 P.3d 182 (although defendant consumed alcohol and 
marijuana before the crime, no evidence showed he was so intoxicated 
during crime that he could not form requisite mental state); State v. Bryan, 
709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985)(defendant was "culpable, before the onset of 
the alleged blackout" from alcohol, "of knowing the risks he would likely 
create by drinking and driving"); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 90 (Utah 1982) 
(defendant must "prove much more than [the fact that] he had been 
drinking" before committing the offense to be entitled to a voluntary 
intoxication defense); State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, if84, 256 P.3d 1102 
C mere fact" defendant was drinking and intoxicated "to a degree" could 
not entitle him to voluntary intoxication instruction). As stated, Defendant 
had to make the "precise showing" that the alcohol or methamphetamine 
"deprived [him] of the capacity to form the mental state necessary" for the 
offense. Cummins, 839 P.2d at 857. Defendant offered no evidence to show 
that he was so intoxicated that he did not have the capacity form the 
requisite mental state. 
Claiming amnesia does not support the defense either. See State v. 
Adams, 2005 UT 62, if 22, 123 P.3d 400; see also State v. Howell, 554 P.2d 1326, 
1328 (Utah 1976) (upholding trial judge's finding that amnesia is not a 
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defense where defendant knew "what he was doing at the time."); State v. 
Jiron, 882 P.2d 685, 689 (Utah App. 1994) (motion for new trial denied, 
where "amnesia is easy to feign and hard to disprove"); see also People v. 
Lucas, 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1017 (Ill. 1989) (affirming admission of expert 
testimony "that a blackout, or alcohol-induced amnesia, does not indicate 
that the person suffering the blackout was incapable of acting knowingly or 
voluntarily during the period which he later cannot remember."); Duffy v. 
State, 415 N.E.2d 715, 718 (Ind. 1981) (affirming conviction where expert 
testimony showed blackouts do "not affect an individual's behavior at the 
time; it simply affects the memory of that behavior," and where lay 
testimony showed that defendant "did not slur his words when talking, did 
not stumble when he walked, was able to respond to commands, and did 
not appear to be drunk"). This is especially true where Defendant testified 
that he could remember, in detail, events before the crime, but conveniently 
could not remember the crime itself. R125:46-51; see Howell, 554 P.2d at 1328. 
Nor does Defendant's behavior while in police custody support the 
defense. Defendant could answer questions and communicate with officers. 
Merely because he was ill at the police station and went to hospital 
sometime after committing the crimes does not prove that he could not form 
the requisite intent when he committed them. Wood, 648 P.2d at 89 
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("Evidence of intoxication must have relevance to the defendant's mental 
state at the time of the crime.")(citation omitted). 
In sum, Defendant did not make the "precise showing" that the 
alcohol or drugs prevented him from forming the requisite mental state. 
Thus he was not entitled to the voluntary intoxication defense. Cummins, 
839 P.2d at 857. Regardless, Defendant has not shown that the State's 
evidence was so lacking that all reasonable counsel would have moved for a 
directed verdict. 
A directed verdict motion is granted only when the State fails to 
establish a prima fade case against the defendant. See State v. Montoya, 2004 
UT 5, ~ 29, 84 P.3d 1183 (directed verdict motion granted only when State 
fails to establish "prima fade" case). And this Court upholds the denial of a 
directed verdict motion when "upon reviewing the evidence and all 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it," "some evidence exists 
from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citation omitted); State v. 
Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah 1986) ("Intent is rarely susceptible to 
direct proof."); State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (Utah 1985) 
(defendant's intent inferred from his actions); State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 
858-859 Qury reasonably inferred defendant had requisite mental state 
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despite evidence of intoxication); Chacon, 962 P.2d at 51 (facts and 
reasonable inferences support defendant had requisite mental state to 
commit crime despite evidence of drinking before committing crime). 
Here, the State presented ample evidence from which the jury could 
reasonably infer that, despite his alleged intoxication, Defendant was 
capable of forming the requisite mental state. Multiple witnesses testified 
that Defendant acted intentionally. Defendant tried to break into "five to 
six" cars before finding the victim's unlocked car. R124:110, 155, 178. 
Defendant sat in the driver's seat-not in the passenger seat or the back 
seat-while holding car keys and searching for the ignition. R124:90, 120. 
When confronted by the victim and her friends, Defendant pulled out a 
large knife, threatened them, and yelled repeatedly-without slurring-
"where is the ignition." R124:90, 125. The only reasonable explanation for 
Defendant's actions is that he intended to steal the victim's car. R125:32. 
Upon realizing that he would not get away with the car, Defendant 
decided to take the purse. He pointed the knife at the victim, grabbed her 
purse, and ran. R124:112. Defendant ran through the parking lot holding the 
purse and did not stumble- despite being chased by at least four people 
and being pushed. R124:127, 145, 147. Defendant tripped during the chase, 
but only because his shoe kept falling off. R124:180. Yet he continued to run. 
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R124:180. And, when a woman jumped out of a car and wrestled the purse 
from Defendant, he maintained his balance, stooped down, picked up the 
keys that had dropped from the purse, and then kept running. 
R124:127,157,183. Lastly, Defendant keenly knew of his actions and his 
surroundings-he even tried to make a deal to escape. R124:158. Thus, the 
State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably 
infer that Defendant had the ability to act with the requisite mental state. 
Counsel had no reason to move for a directed verdict where sufficient 
evidence supported the inference that Defendant could act with the 
requisite mental state. Thus, a directed verdict motion would have been 
futile. As explained, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make a 
futile motion. See Chacon, 962 P.2d at 51 ("Neither speculative claims nor 
counsel's failure to make futile objections establishes ineffective assistance 
of counsel."); see also Featherhat, 2011 UT App 154, ,I36 (holding that because 
sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict, trial counsel's failure to 
make "such a futile 1notion cannot establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel"). 
Defendant argues that a directed verdict motion was required 
because he acted oddly and because he claimed to be unable to remember 
the actual crime. Br. Aplt. 34-37. As explained, however, this is does not 
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negate Defendant's ability to form the requisite mental state to commit the 
crime. See Adams, 2005 UT 62, ,r22 ("proof of drinking or being drunk" 
provides no reasonable basis for the defense); Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19, ,rss 
(although defendant consumed alcohol and marijuana before crime, no 
evidence showed that he was so intoxicated at time of crime that he could 
not form requisite mental state); see also Bryan, 709 P.2d at 260 (defendant 
was "culpable, before the onset of the alleged blackout" from alcohol, "of 
knowing the risks he would likely create by drinking and driving"); Howell, 
554 P.2d at 1328 (amnesia not a defense where Howell knew "what he was 
doing at the time."); Lucas, 548 N.E.2d 1003 at 1017 (" alcohol-induced 
amnesia, does not indicate that the person suffering the blackout was 
incapable of acting knowingly or voluntarily during the period which he 
later cannot remember."); Duffy, 415 N.E.2d 715 at 718 (noting that 
blackouts do "not affect an individual's behavior at the time; it simply 
affects the memory of that behavior," and affirming where lay testimony 
showed that defendant "did not slur his words when talking, did not 
stumble when he walked, was able to respond to commands, and did not 
appear to be drunk"). 
Thus, even assuming that Defendant could not remember the 
robberies, that alone was insufficient to require the trial court to take the 
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case from the jury and to enter a verdict of acquittal based on a voluntary 
intoxication defense. 
In sum, Defendant has not proven that his counsel was ineffective. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on July 15, 2015. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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§ 76-4-101. Attempt--Elements of offense 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime; 
and 
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime; or 
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an 
awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly 
corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed if the 
attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be . 
§ 76-6-301. Robbery 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property 
in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently 
or temporarily of the personal property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against 
another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
.J 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, 
he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
§ 76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense; 
however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and 
the actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is 
immaterial in a prosecution for that offense. 

